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ABSTRACT
Many countries are implementing or at least considering policies to counter
increasingly certain negative impacts from climate change. A large amount of
research has been devoted to the analysis of the costs of climate change and its miti-
gation, as well as to the design of policies, such as the international Kyoto Protocol,
post-Kyoto negotiations, regional initiatives, and unilateral actions. Althoughmost
studies on climate change policies in economics have focused on efﬁciency aspects,
there is a growing literature on equity and justice.
Climate change policy has important dimensions of distributive justice, both
within and across generations, but in this paper we survey only studies on the
intragenerational aspect. We cover several domains including the international,
regional, national, sectoral and inter-personal, and examine aspects such as the
distribution of burdens from climate change, climate change policy negotiations in
general, implementation of climate agreements using tradable emission permits,
and the uncertainty of alternatives to emission reductions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Equity is a major criterion on which to base any policy (Rawls, 1971), including envi-
ronmental policy. In this paper, we focus on climate change policy, as climate change is
characterized by several unique considerations that make equity especially important.
First, it is a transboundary problem of global scale. This means it requires a global solu-
tion. Since there is no supra-national authority to impose policy remedies, the solution
requires the voluntary cooperation of sovereign states. International treaties, such as the
Kyoto Protocol, havemade progress in gaining cooperation, at least among industrialized
countries.1 One feature of the treaty that helped garner cooperation was a set of “ﬂexi-
bility mechanisms” that capitalize on the mutual gains from trade, such as multilateral
emissions trading, or more modest bilateral cooperation through Joint Implementation
(JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). These policy instruments have
the potential to reduce the overall costs of mitigating greenhouse gases (GHGs) sub-
stantially. However, appeals to cost-effectiveness have not been enough to bring many
countries on board, and there are strong indications that equity and related issues are the
dominant considerations. In essence, many are concerned about the cost impact of the
mitigation burden on themselves and in relation to others. Several principles of fairness
have been used as excuses for not ratifying the treaty. For example, the United States
has pointed to the fact that several large emitters, such as China and India, have not
committed to GHG reduction. In turn, developing countries point to their relative lack
of resources and the fact that the industrialized countries failed to do anything about the
problem when they were at a similar key stage of economic development. Less attention
has been paid to the uneven international distribution of the negative impacts (and even
some positive impacts) of climate change on human health, other species, resources and
the environment, but this is an important issue as well.
Another relatively unique equity consideration relates to the time horizon of the
climate change problem. GHGs have long residence times in the atmosphere, in some
cases as much as thousands of years. Hence, the actions of the current generation have
profound implications for those in the future. The intergenerational equity issue and the
associated sustainability issues are, however beyond the scope of this paper, which will
focus on various aspects of intra-generational burden sharing. The reader is referred to
Arrow et al. (1996) and also the discussion of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), such as
the papers by Dasgupta (2006), Nordhaus (2007), and Weitzman (2007).
While the international domain is the main focus in this paper, we will also examine
other aspects of equity. Equity is important at two levels of policy below the international
1 The Kyoto Protocol calls for the reduction of the six major categories of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
for the ﬁrst compliance of 2008-2012. The original signatories in 1997 were 38 industrialized and
transitional economies, including the United States, agreeing to an overall 5.2 percent reduction
in GHGs. To go into effect, the treaty required that at least 55 percent of the world’s countries,
generating at least 55 percent of total GHGs, ratiﬁed the treaty. This threshold was attained in
February 2005. The United States signed but never ratiﬁed the treaty. Several other large countries
includingChina, which recently surpassed theUnited States as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide,
have not ratiﬁed the treaty as well.
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level. Although the United States has not ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol, hundreds of
its cities, states, and regions have made commitments to the Protocol or to remission
reductions in general. Several cooperative ventures are underway, including the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) among several Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States.
Although interregional equity issues were downplayed in the original formation of this
cooperative arrangement, they are starting to rise in terms of participants wanting to
renegotiate their original commitments as the target date nears and the difﬁculty of
implementation becomes more imminent. More recent efforts, such as the Western
(States) Climate Initiative (WCI), are starting to address equity issues more actively at
the outset of their negotiations. Although disparities are not as great in the context of a
single country as in the international case, tensions can become sizeable, especially since
competitive changes and relocation possibilities are more evident. Moreover, conﬂicts
of ﬁscal federalism, such as which jurisdiction should control carbon tax or emission
permit auction revenues, loom on the horizon as momentum in the United States grows
for a national strategy based on nation-wide emissions trading. However, states may be
reluctant to cooperate in a national effort. If emissions’ permits are auctioned rather
than freely granted, or if a carbon tax is implemented instead to supplement emissions
trading in some sectors, the control over sizeable revenues is at stake. In addition to
arguments over rights and power, equity concerns are already being voiced in relation
to state needs and the traditional unevenness of the distribution of federal expenditures
out of any revenues.
Another level of analysis canbeperformed at themeso-scale in termsof thedistribution
of policy impacts across sectors. Again, climate mitigation policy is rather unique, in
that its impacts are likely to fall heavily on a narrow range of sectors. Because most GHG
emissions emanate from fossil fuel extraction, transformation, and end-use, the coal,
oil, and gas sectors are likely to be most affected. Ordinarily, uneven sectoral impacts
may not receive much attention or sympathy. However, the impacts on these sectors
might be extreme to the point of a demise of the coal industry in many countries.
While mine owners may be among the high income group members, mine workers,
especially those who are not unionized, are closer to the bottom rungs, and inhabit
many relatively poor regions such as Appalachia in the United States. At the same time,
some sectors are likely to reap sizeable rewards, including renewable energy and perhaps
nuclear power. The agricultural and forestry sectors may gain sizeable revenues as well
from plant sequestration for carbon, and the oil and gas industries through geological
sequestration.
Another level of concern over equity is at the inter-personal level, where the traditional
focus is on the size distribution of income. Policy instruments are often evaluated in
terms of their progressivity (i.e., whether higher income groups are impacted more than
lower income groups). Climate change policy is somewhat unique here as well, because
it bears heavily on energy prices, prices of a basic necessity. It is not surprising that
most studies to date indicate that carbon taxes or emissions trading are likely to be
regressive. Beyond income groups, there are other interpersonal dimensions. Another
unique aspect of climate change itself is that it would have relatively stronger adverse
effects on the aged or inﬁrm, primarily through higher temperatures but also through
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health-related effects relating to water quality and the increase in vector-borne infectious
diseases.
Still another equity dimension relates to race and ethnicity, which is the basis for the
modernEnvironmental Justice (EJ)movement, a combination of activismand intellectual
inquiry. The movement’s original focus was on the fact that many toxic waste sites were
located in or near minority neighborhoods. Although one explanation is that the poor
tend to reside closer to industrial sites because of lower property values, the EJ conclusion
is that minority groups are hit even harder because of their lack of political power and
a tradition of exploitation. This has led to opposition to emissions trading. Although
the location of GHG reduction does not matter because it is a globally mixed pollutant,
reduction of co-pollutants (e.g., sulfur oxides, particulates, air toxics) does. In this light,
minority neighborhoods might not gain a potential reduction of these co-pollutants if
the major local emitters buy permits and thereby refrain from taking actions that will
lower emissions of all pollutants. In a related vein, many GHG mitigation measures have
the ability to generate jobs related to mitigation in these local areas if permits were not
purchased there.
The distribution of impacts is important for more than just normative reasons. The
energy industry is a powerful interest group in many countries or regions, and these
uneven impacts have already given rise to a call to arms and effective blocking of
many climate change policies. The uneven sectoral impacts can be muted signiﬁcantly
by ﬂexibility in trading across geographic areas and sectors, as well as trading over
time (permit borrowing) to allow for technological change, such as bringing down the
cost of carbon separation and capture, and reducing the possibility of seepage from
geological sequestration. Likewise, there is increasing sensitivity to the plight of the
poor and minorities in many countries, and the climate policy that is likely to result
in inequities in these arenas will have a much more limited chance for approval and
implementation.
Extensive academic research and practical ingenuity have been brought to bear
on the various dimensions of equity and climate change policy. In this paper, we
summarize and critically evaluate the literature and the evolution of recent policy
in this area. The emphasis is on the international domain, where most of the
research and practice has taken place. In Section 2, we begin by deﬁning central
concepts such as efﬁciency, equity and justice, as well as summarizing the main the-
ories underlying these important concepts. This is useful to understand the dis-
cussion in the following sections, where we ﬁrst start with the burdens of climate
change and climate change policies, focusing on both the burdens following from
climate impacts as well as mitigation (Section 3). Section 4 surveys questions of
equity in international climate negotiations, while Section 5 focuses on the imple-
mentation of climate agreements using price incentives (taxes and tradable emis-
sion permits). We then take a look at equity principles that have actually been used
(Section 7), and in Section 8 we shortly discuss equity and uncertainty giving examples
from geoengineering and adaptation. We conclude with some suggestions for further
research.
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2 THEORIES OF EQUITY AND JUSTICE2
2.1 Deﬁnition of Concepts
The concepts of efﬁciency and equity are central in policy analyses. While Pareto Opti-
mality, a situation characterized, in part, by no waste of resources, is an accepted efﬁ-
ciency principle, there is not a consensus on a “best” equity principle. As a result, most
economic analyses have concentrated on efﬁciency problems, and equity often plays a
secondary role in economic policy making ( Johansson-Stenman, 1998), even if it will
always play an important role as a principle of social interactions.
While equality usually means equal allocations of resources or egalitarianism, distin-
guishing between the related concepts of equity, fairness, and justice, may in general
be difﬁcult, and many of the studies on global warming policies referred in this paper
do not attempt to make extensive distinctions. However, both fairness and equity are
often given a speciﬁc meaning in economic theory and philosophical theories of justice
and alternative equity principles exist (see Section 3.3).3 Justice is sometimes taken to
be an umbrella term, incorporating all dimensions of evaluation besides efﬁciency (see,
e.g., Hausman and McPherson (1993)). For instance equality is central in John Rawls
deﬁnition of justice (Rawls (1971)).
Another distinction is between is between fair, equal or just on the one hand, and
good on the other. While in many analyses these concepts do not mean the same thing
as good, they may also help provide a precise deﬁnition to what is good. For instance, in
ethical reasoning, there are two ways to justify if an action is good or bad. The ﬁrst is
to refer to the consequences. Based on this, an action is good if it is the best way (e.g.,
least effort) to attain the aim we strive for (e.g., maximize welfare, reduce greenhouse
gas emissions). This is often referred to as substantive fairness or consequentialism, and
is also related to distributive justice, which is concerned with the allocation of scarce
resources (Roemer (1996)). In our context this would mean incidence of beneﬁts and
costs.
However, another way of moral thinking states that consequences alone do not guide
us whether something is right or wrong (procedural fairness). This is related to the
process by which outcomes are reached. It is not enough to know that the action is the
most effective way to attain the aim. Thus, the claim that the “ends justify the means”
is not necessarily true according to this way of moral thinking.
2 The discussion in this section is based heavily on our previous work (see Rose and Kverndokk (1999,
2004) and Kverndokk and Rose (2004)).
3 Some examples are Feldman and Kirman (1974) who deﬁne fairness as nonenvy, i.e., no agent
prefers what another has to what he himself has, while Varian (1974) deﬁnes equity as nonenvy and
a fair allocation as both equitable and Pareto efﬁcient. Another often used criterion of equity is pro-
portionality (see, e.g., Konow (2000)), where the fair rewards are in proportion to the contributions
that individuals’ control, such as hours worked, but are not related to factors they do not control
such as innate abilities or inherited wealth.
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2.2 Welfare Maximization
One branch of mainstream economics addresses equity by formalizing the concept of a
Social Welfare Function (SWF), which is able to rank all states of the economy, and thus
policy outcomes as well, on the basis of performance criteria such as efﬁciency and equity.
One advantage of the approach is that it is able to separate these two criteria, though
tradeoffs between them can still prevail. Although many alternative equity principles
exist (see Section 3.3), the onemost prevalently used in this approach is “vertical” equity,
which holds that equity increases as utility (or income) disparities between individuals
decrease.
The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics stipulates that a perfectly compet-
itive economy will achieve an overall efﬁcient (Pareto Optimal) allocation of resources.
However, the market is blind to equity, so efﬁcient outcomes as well as inefﬁcient out-
comes in the presence of externalities like pollution, may have undesirable distributional
implications, giving rise to calls for remedial policy. The approach makes efﬁciency-
equity tradeoffs clear. For example, progressive taxation is typically believed to have
equity-promoting, as well as inefﬁciency causing effects. The size of such disincentive
effects is of course an empirical question, although many studies indicate that they are in
practice rather small (e.g., Danziger et al. (1986)). We can be more certain of achieving
equity with the minimum of efﬁciency loss if we utilize “lump sum” transfers, or if we
avoid price-distorting policies. The difﬁculty is that in practice there are few lump sum
transfers, i.e., transfers that are not based on effort.
One way out of the efﬁciency-equity tradeoff is offered by the Coase Theorem (Coase
(1960)), which states that in the case of externalities the delineation and assignment of
property rights will lead, throughmarket exchange, to an efﬁcient allocation of resources,
irrespective of how the rights are distributed (assuming transaction costs are small and
that there are no signiﬁcant income effects). For years, the secondary clause of this
theorem — that the distribution of property rights would not affect efﬁciency — was
used as a justiﬁcation to ignore equity, since it had no affect on efﬁciency. Ironically, it
now offers a reason to address it. For example, as noted in the introduction, equity is
especially important where voluntary cooperation is required so distributional issues do
matter. Moreover, one of the major ways to inﬂuence the equity outcome of mitigation
policy is to use an emissions trading approach and to adjust the initial allocation of
permits accordingly. This is further discussed in Sections 3.3 and 5.3. Thus, equity
can be addressed head-on without undercutting efﬁciency. Alternatively, equity can be
promoted in a case of a carbon tax by the redistribution or spending of the carbon tax
revenues, see Section 3.4.However, in this case, redistributionmay not have the attractive
neutral feature of the Coase Theorem with regard to the equity-efﬁciency tradeoff.
2.3 Social Justice
A theory of justice is a normative theory. Such a theory has two aspects. First, it will
regulate individual rights (and duties), and second, it will propose or evaluate a dis-
tribution of goods (and burdens). Different theories of justice may weight these two
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aspects differently. They are, for instance given equal weight by utilitarians,4 while
Rawls (1971) gives political freedom and rights a lexicographical priority over economic
distribution.
Below, we consider philosophical theories of justice (global justice theories), i.e., the-
ories that are centrally designed for the whole society and are intended to compensate
people for various sorts of bad luck that may result in low levels of income. We will not
consider theories for decentralized distribution decisions (local justice theories), that are
considered independent of other distribution decisions, such as who shall perform mili-
tary service, who shall receive organs for transplantation, etc., but will focus on theories
that provides suggestions to society-wide problems such as income distributions (Elster,
1992). The framework is general and relates to many issues including environmental
problems.
2.3.1 Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a sub-set of welfarism, i.e., theories that focus on welfare outcomes.
The utilitarian aim is to distribute goods so as to maximize the total utility of members
of the society, where “goods” are interpreted broadly to include economic goods, rights,
freedom, and political power (see, e.g., Harsanyi, 1955). A utilitarian welfare function
is usually deﬁned as the sum of the utility of all the members, i.e., all individuals have
an equal weight. One problem with this function as well as for other forms of SWFs,
is the interpersonal comparison of utility, which is not a straightforward issue. We will
not examine these problems in this paper, but refer to, e.g., Arrow (1970). Even though
utilitarianism does not explicitly address equity, its welfare maximization objective does
have distributional implications as it proposes a certain distribution of goods as the
optimal outcome.
2.3.2 Rawlsian Theory
The theory of Rawls (1971) is basically a critique of utilitarianism. According to Rawls,
utilitarianism has no respect for individuals. A person is not seen as valuable and worth
protecting on his/her own right. Rawls argues that a theory of justice should respect the
individuals as ends in themselves.
The methodological starting point of Rawls theory is the “original position.” Many
would argue for what is just or unjust depending on their own position in the society.
Therefore, as a starting point to decide the basic structure of the society, which according
to Rawls is the primary subject of justice, we have to think about a hypothetical and
idealized world where all individuals sit behind a veil of ignorance; the original position.
They do not know their abilities, sex, race or position in the society. All they know is
4 Given that the arguments in the utility function can be both goods and rights.
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that they are going to live in the society. In this hypothetical situation, Rawls argues that
they will agree on certain principles:
First principle:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (Rawls (1971); p. 250).
Second principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest beneﬁt of the least advantaged, and
(b) attached to ofﬁce and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunities (Rawls (1971); pp. 302–303).
The ﬁrst principle, the “Principle ofGreatest EqualLiberty,” is about individual rights
(e.g., freedom of thought and liberty of conscience ). As it has a lexicographic priority,
none of the basic liberties should be traded against material advancement. However, it is
the ﬁrst part of the second principle, the “Difference Principle,” that is mostly referred.
One usual misinterpretation in economics is that Rawls argues for maximizing the utility
of the least advantaged. But his theory is not utilitarian, and he argues for distributing
“primary goods” (goods everybody needs to realize his/her plans of life independent
of what the plan is). While the ﬁrst principle distributes one subset of primary goods,
the basic liberties, the Difference Principle distributes another subset including wealth,
income, power, and authority. The last part of the second principle, the “Principle of Fair
Equality of Opportunity,” requires that we go beyond formal equality of opportunity to
insure that personswith similar skills, abilities, andmotivation enjoy equal opportunities.
Several critics have argued that Rawls went too far in reacting against welfarism.
For example, Sen (1980) argues that primary goods are not the appropriate maximand.
The focus should be on what goods do for people such as enabling people to escape
from morbidity, to be adequately nourished, to have mobility, to achieve self-respect,
to take part in community life and to be happy. Sen calls these functioning, and argues
for equalizing them. For instance, if all primary goods except income were equalized
among people, Rawls would argue that income should be equalized as well. However, a
handicapped person would require more income than an able-bodied one, and needs a
higher income to function in the same way.
The most interesting new aspects of distribution and environmental policy pertain to
transboundary pollution and the fairness of policies across regions and nations. However,
Rawls’ original theory is basically a theory of justice within a nation. In his later work
(Rawls (1999)), he is concerned about international justice. He argues that the welfare
of the citizens is mainly the responsibility of the nation states and that the international
community has a more supportive function, which is to secure a setting where national
societies can develop positively. In addition to principles in his original theory he adds
duties to honor human rights and to assist peoples in unfavorable conditions. This would
also include international transfers to disadvantaged countries.
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2.3.3 Libertarian Theory
In libertarian theory, the baseline is that individual freedom prevails except where others
may be harmed. Thus, this is in the same line as Pareto superiority saying that there is
an improvement in welfare if one or more persons are made better off due to change in
resource use as long as the other persons are at least as well off as before.
Nozick (1974) has provided the best-known statement of libertarian thought. The
theory can be summarized in three principles: justice in appropriation, justice in transfer,
and justice in rectiﬁcation. A distribution of goods is just if it is the end result of an
unbroken chain of just transfers, beginning from a just original appropriation. If these
conditions are not satisﬁed, justice in rectiﬁcation requires that we should establish the
distribution that would have occurred if all unjust links in the chain had been replaced
by just ones.
The ﬁrst principle is a “ﬁnder’s keepers” principle, where the idea is that anyone has
the right to appropriate, exploit, and enjoy the fruits of any unowned piece of nature. The
principle of just transfers says that the outcome of any voluntary transaction between
two or more individuals is just if there is no coercion. If individuals agree on a contract
that will beneﬁt all, there is no reason to stop the contract apart from the case where
anyone uses its power to make the nonagreement state worse for the other parties. The
last principle is the main weakness of the theory, as identifying the point in time where
the earliest violation occurred and, thereafter, the counterfactual chain of just transfers,
may be rather indeterminate.
2.4 Principles of Equity and Justice
We would like to distinguish between equity and justice principles. “Equity principles”
may be deﬁned as normative criteria for how a society should be organized, how goods or
burdens should be distributed, etc. (see, e.g., Rose (1990)). On the other hand, “principles
of justice” are basic rules underlying theories of justice, as most theories of justice are
quite coarse-grained. Thus, they can be interpreted as side constraints to these theories.
Several principles of justice may be in accordance with one equity principle, and vice
versa, see Mueller (2001) and Section 5.3.
The global theories of justice give different equity principles for the distribution of
goods and rights, see Section 3.3 below. However, there may be common denominators
in theories of distributive justice. Meta-principles are principles implicit in all global
theories of justice. Elster (1992), (1993) claims two such meta-principles to be “ethical
individualism” and “ethical presentism.”
The view of ethical individualism (EI) is that justice is attached to individual human
beings. It is a denial of supra-individual and nonhuman justice, the ﬁrst treating groups,
and the latter organic or inorganic nature, as subjects of justice. There are two claims of
EI: (i) theories of justice should allocate goods among individuals, and (ii) this allocation
should be made on the basis of information about individuals (Elster (1993)).
The basis of ethical presentism (EP) is “…that past practices are irrelevant to distribu-
tion in the present, except to the extent that they have left morally relevant and causally
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efﬁcacious traces in the present” (Elster (1992); p. 200). A few examples may clarify this
meta-principle. First, no one should have to suffer from crimes committed by his or her
parents; one cannot choose ones parents. Nevertheless, if people are worse off today than
they otherwise would have been because of discrimination against their parents, a claim
for compensation is compatible with EP. However, compensation does not follow from
EP, since meta-principles are only constraints in a justice evaluation. On the other hand,
if people are worse off today because their parents wasted their resources, compensation
is not compatible with EP.
2.5 Environmental Justice
This approach to environmental policy differs from mainstream approaches at the out-
set, because it gives primacy to concerns about equity. It also differs in that focuses
on the object of equity as disparities according to race, as opposed to income or other
socioeconomic characteristics. Further, it integrates community activism with conven-
tional and unconventional analysis and communication. Finally, its focus is typically
local, though this has important bearing on the design and implementation of broader
climate policy (see, e.g., Pastor (2007)). Recent extensions to global issues (see, e.g.,
Kutting (2004), Hamilton (2005)) have not extended to climate policy at that scale,
however.
The EJ approach is especially skeptical of efﬁciency goals and explanations. Various
independent scholars, faith-based groups, and government agencies have found a dis-
proportionate number of hazardous waste sites in and around minority neighborhoods
in the United States and several other countries. One explanation is that land values are
lower there before the siting or after, and therefore that these locations are more prone to
be inhabited by lower income groups. However, even controlling for income, many stud-
ies have found race to be a factor (Hamilton (1995), Morello-Frosch et al. (2001)). The
explanations then range from mainstream concept of asymmetric information to more
radical theories of exploitation (Bowen, 2002). Moreover, despite government efforts to
remedy the situation in the United States since the early 1990s, the federal government’s
own report indicates that little progress has been made (US Inspector General (2004)).
In the United States, this perspective presents a possible obstacle to the implemen-
tation of cap and trade. Although GHGs are globally mixed pollutants, various co-
pollutants of combustion and other processes are not. Thus, there is a concern that,
locally, mitigation and permit purchases are not equivalent from an environmental stand-
point. A locality or region that purchases permits to avoid having to mitigate GHGs
would forego the opportunity for a reduction in particulates, sulfur oxides, air toxics, etc.,
and might even witness an increase up to the criteria pollutant limit. From an economic
standpoint, the decision differs as well. The purchase of permits may be in the best
interest of the emitting ﬁrm, but may not be so from the standpoint of the community.
Some types of mitigation are seen as an opportunity to create additional jobs. At the
same time, the job loss due to inefﬁcient choices by emitting ﬁrms (passing up lower
cost permits in favor of local mitigation) is not usually considered. Counter-arguments
that permit auction revenues can be used to offset negative environmental or economic
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consequences are not well received by the EJ community given the severity of potential
health problems from some co-pollutants and the distrust of government promises.
Ironically, in one major way the EJ situation is just the opposite if extrapolated to
the international level. Developing countries, typically comprised of nonwhites, have
relatively more low-cost mitigation/sequestration options and are thus more likely to
be permit sellers and hence mitigate proportionally more of all pollutants than would
industrialized countries.
Another example where minority groups, as well as the poor in general, may be hit
relatively harder by environmental policies is biofuels (see, e.g., Runge and Senauer
(2007)). Corn prices have increased as corn is used in ethanol production, which has
lead to higher food prices in the United States and in developing countries, culminating,
for example, in tortilla riots in Mexico. Also, the demand for biofuels has had a negative
impact on the Amazon and people living there. As soybean farmers are switching to corn
in the United States, Brazilian soybean farmers are displacing cattle pastures and these
in turn are displacing the Amazon forest.
In the remaining sections, we will discuss equity in climate change policies. While
the equity problems discussed are mainly about distributive justice (consequences), we
will also discuss procedural justice. As mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on
intragenerational justice problems. Intergenarational justice related to global warming
are mainly concentrated around the question what we should aim for, or how large the
emissions or atmospheric concentration target should be. On the other side, intragener-
ational justice is mainly concerned about how we should distribute the burdens. While
the distinction sometimes can be difﬁcult, the discussion below gives some examples of
intragenerational equity and justice related to global warming that have been discussed
in the economic literature.
3 THE BURDENS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICIES
3.1 Who Suffers Most From Climate Change?
Over the next decades, the world will probably face large climatic changes in form of
increased temperature, sea level rise, changed wind and precipitation patterns, more
extreme weather, etc. (IPCC (2007)). However, the damage of climate change will not
be evenly distributed among countries or among the individuals in a country (Tol et al.
(2000), Tol (2002a, 2002b), Yohe et al. (2007)). For increases in global mean temperatures
less than 1◦C–3◦C above 1,990 level, some impacts will be beneﬁcial to some sectors and
regions while costly to others, e.g., agricultural production may increase in Northern
Europe, while it may be reduced in large parts of Africa. Global mean losses are expected
to be 1%–5% of gross domestic product (GDP) for 4◦C of warming, with larger losses
in developing countries, and the net damage costs of climate change are likely to increase
over time. Vulnerabilities also differ considerably between regions, and poorer countries
will face higher negative impacts than richer countries. Development may, however,
reduce overall vulnerability to climate change as richer countries seem to have a higher
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ability to adapt. The unequal distribution of impacts makes this a concern of distributive
justice.
While the estimation of damages is tied up to intergenerational equity as this represents
a present value estimate, meaning that the discount rate is important (see, e.g., the
discussion around Stern Review), there is also one aspect of intragenerational equity
involved in the aggregation of damage estimates due to the uneven distribution of income
across individuals and regions. One problemwith damage cost estimates is that the values
depend on income. Using the standard methodology from economics such as willingness
to pay or accept, rich people (or countries) are willing to pay more or to require higher
compensation than poor people (or countries). This means that even if consequences
of global warming may be more severe in poor countries measured as lives lost, loss of
biodiversity or in productionmeasures such asGDP, the aggregatedmeasure of damages
may be lower than in richer countries. To deal with the unequal income distribution,
one methodology that has been proposed in the literature is to use equity weights. The
idea is that a dollar to a poor person is not the same as a dollar to a rich person, meaning
that we cannot add up monetized losses. Instead we should add up welfare losses and
then monetize. It follows from this that we should attach different weights to a given
monetary loss, where the weight is higher in a poor country than in a rich country as the
weight depends inversely on the income level.
Equity weights have been discussed in cost-beneﬁt analyses for several decades (see,
e.g., Little and Mirrlees (1974)) and an early contribution in the context of global warm-
ing is Fankhauser et al. (1997). They showed that the aggregate damage ﬁgures based
on equity weights signiﬁcantly depend on the social welfare function chosen.5 A recent
study is Anthoff et al. (2007), who chose a utilitarian welfare function, and concluded
that equityweighted estimates of themarginal damage of CO2 emissions are substantially
higher than estimates without equity weights (by a factor of ten ormore depending on the
pure rate of time preference etc.). To ﬁnd the monetary estimate of damages, the authors
argue that the estimates should be normalized with the marginal utility of consumption
of a speciﬁc region, and the estimates may also vary considerably with the region chosen.
Further, estimates are also sensitive to the intraregional income distribution as well as
assumptions on inequality aversion. The latter is important as different scenarios have
different income distributions. The conclusion that the use of equity weights increases
damage cost estimates is interesting. While the Stern Review (Stern (2007)) has been
criticized for its high damage cost estimates due to a low discount rate (Nordhaus (2007),
Dasgupta (2006)), the review does not use equity weighting explicitly.6 Thus, taking the
uneven income distribution seriously may actually increase the damage cost estimates in
the Stern Review.
5 Johansson-Stenman (2000) shows, however, that some of themost extreme and unintuitive results in
Fankhauser et al. (1997) depend on misunderstandings with respect to permissible transformations
of the utility function.
6 The Stern Review recognizes equity weighting and increases the damage costs by 25% based on
calculations in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). However, the impacts of equity weighting are much
lower in the Nordhaus and Boyer study than in most other studies, see, e.g., Anthoff et al. (2007)
referred above.
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The fact that estimates vary depending on the social welfare function is a problem
for policy making. When a speciﬁc welfare function is chosen, ethical views as well as
other speciﬁc assumptions are made at the same time. Equity weighting assumes a social
planner and a speciﬁc social welfare function, but it is hard to formulate a social welfare
function that represents the ethical views of all agents (Brekke et al. (1996)). Another
problem with equity weighting is that it has to be used consistently in economic policy
making and not just in some areas such as climate policy in order for policy making to
be consistent. Further, aggregation of welfare losses across different countries assumes
a supranational perspective such as a global social planner, but decisions are made by
national decision makers. This is studied in Anthoff and Tol (2007), who focus on
international equity weights in climate policies under national decision-making. They
study four different ethical positions taken by the decision makers. In the ﬁrst, decision
makers do not care about what happens abroad (sovereignty). Second, they are altruistic
toward people living in other countries (altruistic). Third, the decision makers com-
pensate damages done abroad (compensation), and fourth, the national decision makers
feel responsible for damages done abroad, but cannot compensate (good neighbor). The
different ethical views give very different estimates for marginal damage or carbon taxes
(given that the tax is set equal to the marginal damage) at the national level, with the
highest tax for good neighbors and lowest in the sovereignty case. Thus, this shows that
a wide range of carbon taxes can be defended based on different ethical positions.
The use of equity weights also triggers the discussion of equity versus efﬁciency. If one
does not care about equity at all at the social level, introducing equity weights will imply
large inefﬁciency losses (Harberger (1978)).7 If one cares about equity, one alternative
to base the policy on equity weighing is to redistribute income as when the income
distribution is just, distributional weights will be identical (Fankhauser et al. (1997)).
It has been argued that it is socially inefﬁcient to use equity weights in cost-beneﬁt
analysis and that this implies large inefﬁciency losses when distributional matters can
be dealt with through income taxation instead (Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)). While
this may be a difﬁcult task in international climate policy, Johansson-Stenman (2005)
challenges this argument within a general framework in the context of national decision
making, and shows a large range of cases where equity weights are (second-best) optimal
to use. However, he concludes that the question of whether equity weights should be
used cannot be answered in general, but depends on the proposed project or policy
instrument.
3.2 Will Mitigation Costs be Evenly Distributed?
To avoid large impacts of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions reductions are nec-
essary.8 This would require increasing energy efﬁciency of production or even reduced
7 One amusing example given in Harberger (1978) is to send ice-cream on camel-back across the
desert from a richer oasis to a poorer one. With a high social inequality aversion, Harberger ﬁnds
that “up to 63/64 of the ice-cream could melt away without causing the project to fail the test.”
8 Geoengineering and other alternatives are discussed in Section 7.
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production, interfuel substitution, changes in land use conﬁgurations, or other practices,
most of which could lead to lower consumption levels. However, the costs of green-
house gas mitigations are not evenly distributed among regions or countries. The recent
IPCC report conﬁrms the earlier reports in that even if the overall mitigation costs may
not be very high,9 the best economic potential for emission reductions is probably in
nonOECD countries (Barker et al. (2007)). Thus, cheap reduction options are mainly
found in Eastern Europe and developing countries.10 In general, the mitigation costs
of a country mainly depend on the level of energy-efﬁciency, the production structure,
and the availability of renewable energy sources. We should also note that mitigation
policies in one region have impacts on other regions in terms of their emission levels
and mitigation costs, due to impacts on fossil fuel prices, competitiveness, technology
spillovers etc.
Above, equity weights were discussed as a way to aggregate and compare different
damage cost estimates of climate change. The question remains if equity weights are
relevant when it comes to mitigation costs. Azar (1999) shows that equity weighting
may be appropriate here as well. Optimizing a global social welfare function, assuming
that the world consists of a rich and a poor region, would require equality weights used
also for mitigation costs in the poor region, but not in the rich. This follows as costs
and beneﬁts are normalized with the marginal utility of consumption in the rich region
(see also Anthoff et al., 2007). In his approach, even if different weight factors used in
the literature give substantially different damage estimates, they yield the same optimal
emission reductions. The reason is that also mitigation costs are weighted in the same
way, and this offsets the effect of different weighted damage estimates. This will be
further discussed in Section 4.11
3.3 Equity Principles of Burden Sharing
Because there is no consensus on a best deﬁnition of equity, several alternative criteria
have been put forth for the interregional and international analysis of the equity impli-
cations of environmental policy, most of them being extensions of interpersonal equity
principles discussed above (Rose (1992)). Ten equity principles, a general operational
rule emanating from each, and a corresponding rule applicable for the example of the
9 The costs of committing to the Kyoto Protocol may be less than 0.1% of GDP in Europe with
ﬂexible permit trading. Also, stabilization targets such as 550 or 650 ppm CO2-equivalents may be
reached to a cost of about 1% or lower of global GDP by 2030.
10 For instance smaller CO2 emissions reductions (5%–15%) by 2010 in China may give potentially
positive GDP effects due to a double dividend effect (Garbaccio et al., 1999).
11 Another intragenerational equity aspect is also important for optimal emission reductions. As
mentioned above, Anthoff et al. (2007) found that damage estimates are sensitive to the inequality
aversion. This is further conﬁrmed in Shiell (2003) who calculates optimal global greenhouse gas
emissions under various inter- and intragenerational equity assumptions including discounting and
different equity weights for different world regions. She ﬁnds that the traditional conﬂict between
ethical approaches (prescriptive) andmarket approaches (descriptive) can be signiﬁcantlymoderated
with the introduction of another dimension of equity, namely the inequality aversion parameter in
the utility functions.
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allocation of tradable emission permits at the national level are presented in Table 1.12
The principles are divided into three categories. The ﬁrst is “allocation-based’ criteria,
which focus on the before-implementation (before-trading) implications for mitigation
costs. The “outcome-based” criteria focus on the post-implementation position, which
would include mitigation costs and permit revenues/expenditures, as well as the ben-
eﬁts of the mitigation. The “process-based” criteria focus more on the conditions that
lead to the outcome distinguishing between ideal political conditions, pragmatic political
conditions, or pure market forces, respectively.13
Of course, there are other levels of application of equity criteria, including sectors
and households. In some ways, these units are superior to regions, because they address
the issue of relative impacts in terms of welfare of the individual (the basic unit in
a democracy). Although policy making will take place at a more aggregate level, it is
important that equity at the international and interregional levels ﬁlter down to themicro
(individual ) level, for which economic welfare is measured.
To be operational, an equity criterionmust be applied to a “reference base,” essentially
a metric or index, which by itself has no ethical content, i.e., it is a quantity to which a
speciﬁc value judgement needs to be applied to give it any explicit normative implications
(Rose (1992), Rose and Stevens (1998)). Examples of reference bases are income, energy
production, energy use, population, GHG emissions, etc. To illustrate the use of equity
principles, consider permit trading and the following six permit allocation formulas for
the initial allocation of permits14 (consisting of an equity criterion and an associated
reference base) applied at the regional level,where the reference base is in theparenthesis:
1. Sovereignty (emissions based).
2. Sovereignty (energy-use based).
3. Sovereignty (energy-production based).
4. Egalitarian (population based).
5. Economic Activity (GRP based).
6. Ability to Pay (inverse-GRP based).
Note that there is no one-to-one correspondence between criteria and reference bases.
For example, the Sovereignty criterion can be implemented according to more than one
reference base, and Gross Regional Product (GRP) can serve as a reference base for more
than one criterion. Reference base distinctions are important for several reasons. First, as
in the case of three bases applied to the Sovereignty criterion, they can reﬂect alternative
energy policy positions. For example, Formula 5 simulates a “downstream” administered
program on fossil energy end-users, while Formula 6 simulates an “upstream” program
12 The principles presented are discrete measures of equity. A more general, continuous formulation
of equity based on the Atkinson Inequality Index is examined by Eyckmans et al. (1993).
13 Most of the principles presented in Table 1 are altruistic in nature. For an approach to equity issues
based on self-interest discussed in other portions of this review, the reader is referred to UNCTAD
(1992) and Barrett (2005). Altruistic principles are more consistent with most notions of justice and
fairness than are the nonaltruistic principles such as the Kantian imperative and “absence of envy.”
14 In Section 5.3, we take a further look at the initial permit allocation from a philosophical point of
view.
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on fossil energy producers. Most importantly, the welfare implications of various refer-
ence bases for the same equity criterion will differ as well, because each reference base
leads to a different set of permit allocations and hence a different set of sales/purchases
outcomes.
The results of the application of the six equity formulas for permit trading to the
sharing of the Kyoto Protocol target within the United States by Rose and Zhang (2004)
yield some interesting results. First, for some of the formulas (e.g., Sovereignty/Energy
Use), there is a very little variation of welfare gains across regions, primarily because the
mitigation costs before trading are relatively uneven and the volume of trading is not
large. Second, for some regions (e.g., Southwest, Mid-Atlantic, New England) there is
little difference across equity formulas, primarily because their permit allocations vary
so little. For some regions, the equity formula does matter greatly (e.g., South Central,
North Central), because of the positive correlation between their per capita incomes
and population. The results on this score differ greatly from their application in the
international domain. For example, the egalitarian (per capita) criterion leads to the
relatively lowest cost burden being incurred by one of the regions of the United States
with the highest per capita income (North Central States), because this is also the most
populous region. This is just the opposite of the result in the international domain,
where countries such as China and India stand to gain the most from application of this
criterion.
Interestingly, the Rose–Zhang study and many on permit trading at the international
level (see, e.g., Rose and Stevens, 1998, Rose et al., 1998) indicate that although equity
principles differ signiﬁcantly from a philosophical standpoint, many of them yield very
similar outcomes in practice in terms of net costs alone, or even net beneﬁts when avoided
climate damage is considered (see also the similar conclusion by Ringius et al. (2002),
with regard to the practical application of a set of equity principles that overlap somewhat
with those presented in Table 1). The main outlier is the egalitarian principle, especially
in the international context given the huge populations of China and India, which would
result in transfers in the hundreds of billions of dollars per year and is thus politically
untenable. The reason for the relative homogeneity of outcomes is explained by features
of the three major aspects of the determination of net beneﬁts of climate policy. First,
beneﬁts (avoided climate change damages) are the same no matter how the permits are
allocated. Second, according to the Coase Theorem, there is a unique equilibrium (in
this case mitigation costs) after property rights (emission permits) are exchanged, so
this aspect does not vary. Third, the only feature that does vary is the purchase and
sale of permits. Thus policy makers might wish to look beyond philosophical issues in
the negotiation process if they do not result in practical differences. Arguing over ﬁne
points for some equity principles may not be time well spent if the equity outcomes are
relatively even for them not only in the case of permit trading but in general.
3.4 The Incidence of Climate Change Policy
In addition to emission permits, a carbon tax is also a policy instrument for mitigating
climate change impacts that is often applied in economic analysis. A number of studies
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have examined the income distribution impacts of carbon taxes or carbon emission
permits (see, e.g., Harrison (1994), Dinan and Rogers (2002), the reviews by Repetto and
Austin (1997), and Speck (1999), and the more general review of incidence of pollution
control in general by Parry et al. (2006)). We begin by summarizing the three special
features most emphasized to distinguish the impacts of these policies in contrast to the
incidence of taxes in general.
First, although the initial focus is on a few but very prominent sectors that emit
carbon (Coal/Oil/Gas extraction, transportation, and reﬁning), the fundamental role
of these products, however, means that carbon reduction policies will eventually ripple
throughout the economy, with possibly surprising outcomes. This is one of the major
reasons general equilibrium models are often used to evaluate incidence.
Second, fossil energy products and most energy-intensive processed goods (food,
housing, and automobiles) are necessities, making it relatively more difﬁcult to substitute
away from them. Spending on necessities is inversely related to income, and, hence,
all other things being equal, carbon taxes would lean toward being regressive in partial
equilibrium terms.
Third, unlike most existing taxes, carbon taxes are not aimed primarily at raising
revenue. Moreover, they do not intentionally create a distortion in the price system but
are intended to correct one, though they can create some new, but likely lesser distortions
through a tax-interaction effect.
These factors have important implications for the disposition of carbon tax revenues
(or revenues from the auction of carbon emission permits) by the implementing authority
(country or region), including the possibility of using carbon tax revenues for tax relief
that promises to reduce the distortionary nature of the pre-existing tax system. This
revenue recycling can take a number of forms (reductions in personal income taxes,
corporation income taxes, etc.), with different distributional impacts. Again, however,
the ﬁnal impacts of these alternatives are not a priori obvious when one allows for general
equilibrium considerations.
Overall, a large number of other factors, both unique to carbon taxation and applicable
to tax policy in general, can have a major bearing on the relative unevenness of impacts
(OECD (1995), Parry et al. (2006)). It is also important to note several factors that affect
the size of the aggregate impact, since it will also have a bearing on the degree to which
the baseline income distribution changes. Of course, the size of the aggregate impact can
affect the distribution of impacts in highly nonlinear models or where such factors as
income elasticities of demand vary strongly across income groups.Major factors include:
1. Magnitude of the carbon tax or emission permit price, and energy-intensity of
the economy. The higher these factors, the larger the overall impact and the more
profound income inequalities of impacts can become in relation to the baseline
(Hamilton and Cameron (1994)).
2. The unit upon which the tax is based (e.g., energy equivalent, carbon emissions, or
carbon content), the narrowness or breadth of products or entities on which that tax
is imposed, and the point in the production or consumption process at which the
tax is imposed. These bear on the relative bluntness or precision of the policy and
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hence its cost-effectiveness and overall impacts. For example, Barker and Kohler
(1998) found a tax on energy as a whole to be regressive but a tax on motor fuels to
be progressive (cf., however, Wiese et al., 1995, West and Williams, 2004).
3. The extent of factor mobility, which determines the degree to which the impacts
result in unemployment and capital retirements. For example, Kopp (1992) noted
the regressivity of transitional effects on coal miners having to ﬁnd jobs in other
industries.
4. The degree to which the impacts result in unemployment. Those already in lower
income groups are less able to withstand the shocks of both temporary and long-term
unemployment (OECD (1995), Fullerton and Heutel (2005)).
5. The extent to which general equilibrium effects are taken into account to capture
production/income distribution/consumption interactions in response to the policy
(OECD (1995), Goulder (1995), Oladosu and Rose (2007)). For example, a large
decrease in coal production may have a disproportionate effect on income of high-
wage unionized miners, but the decrease in their consumption may be for products
that are characterized by a predominant number of low-wage earners, such as food
(see, e.g., Rose and Beaumont (1988)).
6. The extent to which dynamic effects are taken into account (e.g., with respect to
savings and investment). The current income distribution has an effect on economic
growth, which in turn affects future income distribution (Bovenberg et al. (2005)).
Here progressivity is often thought to have a detrimental effect on future growth,
though the effect on future income distribution is ambiguous. Dynamic effects also
have a bearing on asset markets, such as the extent to which ﬁnancial returns are
affected and its implications for investments (Harrison (1994)).
7. The use of annual income versus lifetime income as a reference base (e.g., as proxied
by consumption). The latter is the more appropriate measure given the long-run
nature of the issue (see, e.g., Dinan and Rogers (2002)).
8. The extent to which demographic considerations pertaining to household compo-
sition are taken into account (Hamilton and Cameron (1994)); related to this is the
demarcation of income groups, especially at the highest and lowest levels (Kopp
(1992)).
9. The type of policy instrument used. Free granting of permits is likely to be more
regressive than auctioning permits (or implementing a carbon tax) because the for-
mer provides assets to owners of capital, while the latter provides opportunities for
progressive revenue recycling (Parry et al. (2006)).
10. The type of revenue recycling (including lump-sum transfers) and in contrast to
alternatives such as budget deﬁcit reduction and individual and corporate tax relief
(see, e.g., Goulder et al. (1997), Parry et al. (1999), Parry (2004)). The latter is usually
considered the most regressive.
11. Market structure. Regressive effects increase with the ability to shift the tax forward
to consumers (Burtraw et al. (2001)).
12. Basic parameters and assumptions of the analyticalmodel (especially price elasticities
of demand and supply, elasticities of substitution with respect to inputs and imports,
market structure, labor supply elasticities, etc.). These factors determine the ability
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to shift the tax forward onto customers or backward onto factors of production. In
terms of the latter, shifts on to labor are likely to be more regressive than shifts
onto capital (see, e.g., Boyd et al. (1995), Bovenberg et al. (2005)). Also, the greater
the variation in price and income elasticities of demand, the greater the potential
progressivity or regressivity.
If we try to summarize studies of carbon taxes on households, we ﬁnd that the dis-
tributional effects of a carbon tax can often be regressive unless special circumstances
prevail (Bye et al. (2002), Oladosu and Rose (2007)). Consequently, there is likely to be a
conﬂict between efﬁciency and equity goals, though this can be diminished somewhat if
tax revenues are used either directly or indirectly in favor of the low-income groups. Of
course, other groups may seek relief as well. Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) have derived
a useful result that only a small portion of revenues are needed to leave corporations in
the United States no worse off.15
3.5 Sectoral Impacts
The sectoral impacts of climate mitigation policy depend on several considerations. One
is policy instrument choice and design. Free granting of permits imposes a relatively
lower burden on emitters, mainly carbon-intensive industry, as would the recycling of
carbon taxes to reduce corporate tax rates. Even more signiﬁcant is the stringency of
the emissions cap given the exponential shape of the mitigation cost curve in most
sectors.
Instrument choice and design is also a major inﬂuence on sectoral differentials. Rose
and Oladosu (2002) estimated that a cap and trade system in the United States to meet
its Kyoto commitment would lead to a permit price of $128 per ton carbon equivalent if
it was applied only to carbon mitigation. Allowing for sequestration as well lowered the
estimate of the permit price to $43, and adding methane mitigation lowered it further
to $33. Under the more narrow policy scope, sectoral output losses in the coal, oil,
and electric utility industries were projected to be 64%, 25%, and 13%, respectively,
compared with 32%, 8%, and 4% for the most ﬂexible of the three designs. Also, not
surprisingly, the agricultural and forestry sector impacts changed form a 3% output loss
under the narrow scope to a 1% gain under the broadest scope.
Aune et al. (2007) focus on the impacts of climate policies for fossil fuel producers,
particularly how different climate policy instruments such as CO2 taxes and renewable
energy subsidies affect the proﬁtability of fossil fuel production, given a ﬁxed global cli-
mate target in the long term.They ﬁnd thatCO2 taxes reduce the short-termproﬁtability
to a greater extent than technology subsidies, since the competition from CO2-free
energy sources does not become particularly noticeable until decades later. Most fossil
fuel producers therefore prefer subsidies to their competitors above CO2 taxes. How-
ever, this conclusion does not apply to all producers. Oil producers outside OPEC lose
15 Note also, that while the carbon tax approach is usually characterized as comprehensive, it can be
partial (as in a partial auction of permits) if some baseline emissions (or fuels in an “upstream”
system) are exempted.
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the most by the subsidizing of CO2-free energy, while CO2 taxes only slightly reduce
their proﬁts. This is connected to OPEC’s role in the oil market, as the cartel chooses
to reduce its extraction signiﬁcantly in the tax scenario. The reason is that OPEC con-
siders the oil price as a decreasing function of its own production. It will then be able
to keep up the oil price and therefore its marginal revenue from oil sales by reducing
production. Thus, the nonOPEC countries can free ride on this production reduction.
The results seem to be consistent with observed behavior of important players in the
climate negotiations, as the OPEC countries and the major coal and gas producing coun-
tries will lose most from an international climate policy with short term reduction goals,
such as the Kyoto Protocol. These countries have also been major opponents to the
treaty.
Sathaye et al. (2007) list manymitigationmeasures that improve productivity in nearly
all sectors. Also, concern over loss of competitiveness in many sectors may be misplaced.
Zhang andBaranzini (2004) reviewed several empirical studies and concluded that energy
or carbon taxes do not have a major effect on this concern (see also IPCC (2001)). Still,
over time, small changes in competitiveness can add up. Unless carbon capture and
sequestration solves its cost and environmental issues, we can anticipate the demise of
the coal industry in many countries, and declines are likely in the oil industry. No doubt
renewable energy industries will ﬂourish in any case.
Note that mitigation in some sectors promotes various other aspects of equity. For
example, Sathaye et al. (2007, p. 726) point out that various agricultural mitigation
and sequestration options in developing countries “promote social harmony and gender
equality.”
4 EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS
As global warming is a typical global public good problem,where climate change depends
on global emissions of greenhouse gases, there is no reason to expect the problem to be
solved without an international agreement, as no country or government has economic
incentives to mitigate what may be deﬁned as the socially optimal amount.
Before studying the process and outcome of negotiations, one interesting question is
to study an ethical starting point for international greenhouse gas negotiations. Eyckmans
and Schokkaert (2004) describe what they call an ideal approach or a normative view
of greenhouse gas negotiations. The ethical focus is inspired by John Rawls’ Difference
Principle (Rawls, 1971), and is to concentrate on the poorest people of the world. The
top priority of an agreement, according to the authors, should be to raise the living
standard of the poor people above the minimum living standard threshold. To do so, one
should not ideally concentrate on nations as if they were individuals, as this will not take
into account the distribution of income or consequences of global warming within the
country. The authors also defend a consequentialist approach, whichmeans that burdens
should not necessarily be distributed according to past responsibility for greenhouse gas
emissions as is often argued, but to help the extreme poor; the solution should be sensitive
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to consequences.16 In addition to this, Eyckmans and Schokkaert take a position against
the welfarism embodied in utilitarianism, as this does not take into account the position
of the poorest. To raise the poorest people above a minimum threshold implies that they
are given greater weight in the calculation of the aggregate than people with a high living
standard. This may point in the direction of equity weighting as discussed above, and
excludes simple sum ranking, such as maximizing world gross national product (GNP)
as the aim of an international treaty.
The focus on the poor is particularly relevant as cheap reduction options are mainly
found outside OECD, see above. But emission scenarios from IPCC show that business-
as-usual emissions in these countries will grow considerably over the next decade (IPCC
(2000)). In these scenarios, it is assumed that the developing countries will develop and
reduce poverty. Even in the worst case scenario when it comes to economic growth, it is
assumed that the average per capita income in developing countries is 12 times higher in
2100 than in 1990.However, to stabilize concentrations ofCO2 at 450 or 550 ppm in 2100,
which are often mentioned as stabilization goals, will require a substantial reduction in
the emission growth for the developing countries.17
Most economic research on international climate negotiations has, however, focused
on the process of negotiations using game theory (see, e.g., Barrett (2005), for an overview).
In this literature, one common assumption is that each negotiating country only take
into account its own material payoff and acts as a selﬁsh agent (i.e., not in line with the
framework discussed above). Using noncooperative game theory, assuming that agree-
ments cannot be binding, analysts deﬁne a noncooperative outcome in greenhouse gas
emissions, which is a Nash equilibrium where countries do not cooperate, but takes the
other country’s actions into account when deciding their emissions. In contrast, a full
cooperative outcome is deﬁned as the outcome that maximizes the aggregate payoff to all
countries. This outcome is not sustainable, as most countries will beneﬁt from free riding
on other countries’ emission reductions. The challenge is to improve the noncooperative
outcome or to sustain the full cooperative outcome.
The conclusions from this literature do not seem very optimistic if the aim is to
reduce climate change (Barrett (2005)). A self-enforcing agreement, in such a way that
16 One counter-example about responsibility offered by the authors is if we discover that a huge global
environmental problem is caused by consumption of a commodity heavily concentrated in the poor
area of the world. At the time of consumption nobody knew that this would create an environmental
problem. Should then the poor world bear the burden of mitigation policies, or should the rich
countries bear the largest burden? Eyckmans and Schokkaert (2004) favor the second answer. We
follow up the subject of historical responsibility, see Section 5.3.
17 An interesting equity aspect therefore concerns the choice between economic development and
preserving the environment. While this sustainability problem clearly concerns intergenerational
equity, it is also a question of equity within one generation; do we have to choose between less
poverty and a good environment for people living in 2100, or is a good environment necessary for
development? The latest IPCC report (Sathaye et al., 2007) discusses this problem but argues that
greenhouse gas emissions “are inﬂuenced by but not rigidly linked to economic growth.” It further
argues that development aid and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may help reduce
vulnerability and provide ﬁnancial resources for development.
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no signatory can gain by withdrawing and no nonsignatory can gain by acceding is hard
to construct and will in general fail to sustain the full cooperative equilibrium. The
number of signatories will be small compared to the number of players in the game, or the
emission reductions will be small compared to the full cooperative outcome. However,
it should be noted that a self enforcing agreement does not take fairness into account.
Compliance is a further problem, as credibility of punishments is in general small. But,
there may be ways to improve the agreement by using side payments as well as linking
the environmental negotiations to other nonenvironmental issues such as international
trade (see, e.g., Folmer et al. (1993)).
Playersmay, however, not only care aboutmaterial beneﬁts. This is for instance studied
by Hoel and Schneider (1997), who assumes that there is a cost to deviate from a social
norm saying that countries should not free ride. Thus, this is a penalty that increases
in the participation of others, and this cost is born by the free riders only. In this way
the problem of credible punishments as discussed above are avoided. Not surprisingly,
this norm leads to more cooperation. In addition to this, equity arguments have often
been seen as a means to facilitate negotiations, as equity principles may serve as focal
points that may reduce negotiation costs (Schelling (1960)). Preferences for equity may
improve cooperation in international environmental agreements compared to the rel-
atively pessimistic predictions from the traditional economic models (Lange and Vogt
(2003), Lange (2006)). However, this is based on the assumption that countries agree on
a single equity criterion. This may not be the case. Lange et al. (2007a), demonstrates
the self-serving use of equity principles, meaning that countries put forward the equity
principle that serve their interests; support for an equity principle is stronger the less
costly it is compared to the alternatives.18 The bargaining power of the parties may
depend on the possibility of using self-serving equity criteria supporting their demands.
This discussion leads us into the ﬁeld of behavioral economics, which emphasizes
that people are not solely motivated by material payoffs and that perceived fairness and
social norms inﬂuence decisions (see, e.g., Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008)). This
is relevant as personal communication is important in negotiations and also as Govern-
ments may like to implement the preferences of people. Some of the conclusions from
this literature are more optimistic when it comes to mitigate climate change and achieve
a fair outcome, for instance that people are willing to choose cooperative behavior but
only if others are doing so. They are also willing to contribute more to good social causes
if they think other people are contributing, and teams seems to act more altruistic than
individuals, which may be good news in negotiations where countries are represented by
a group of people. Further, reciprocity such as punishments is not always motivated by
future gains but also of what is considered fair or right, which may make punishments
more credible. But on the other hand, people’s behavior does not always support fair
outcomes. What is perceived as fair is often inﬂuenced by self interest, as mentioned
above, and we like to avoid situations and information that would force us to reﬂect over
ethical issues if this is in conﬂict with our material interests (Nyborg (2008)).
18 Social preferences may also depend on nationality and culture, see, e.g., the seminal paper of Roth
et al. (1991) or Konow et al. (2008) for a recent study.
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The last step in international climate agreements is for signatories to choose their
emission levels, i.e., the outcome of the agreement. If countries are symmetric, i.e., equal,
it is usually assumed that signatories choose their emission levels to maximize the total
payoff, which again requires equal provisions or emission reductions. For asymmetric
or heterogeneous countries, other solution concepts are studies such as the Nash bar-
gaining solution where gains are distributed according to bargaining power, the core
focusing on the grand coalition of all countries where no coalition of countries can gain
by rejecting the proposal, and the Shapley value where the gain is distributed by side
payments that average each player’s marginal contribution to the different coalitions that
might form (Barrett (2005)). These concepts do not explicitly take into account fairness,
and illustrates that there may be a conﬂict between equity and efﬁciency considera-
tions. This leads us into the discussion of implementing climate agreements using price
incentives.
5 IMPLEMENTING CLIMATE AGREEMENTS USING PRICE
INCENTIVES
5.1 Carbon Taxes
To ﬁnd the efﬁcient abatement level in each country, the standard economic recommen-
dation is to use Pigouvian taxes on the harmful emissions. Optimizing a global welfare
function would require that the tax should be set so that it reﬂects the marginal social
damage of greenhouse gas emissions. Alternatively, the tax should be set so that the
emission target from a climate agreement is met. In the ﬁrst best optimum, this would
lead to a uniform tax of all polluters, i.e., across sectors and countries. Thus, the optimal
carbon tax should be globally uniform. This is also the recommendation in the Stern
Review (Stern (2007)).
This result was ﬁrst criticized by Eyckmans et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal
(1994). They study the outcome of maximizing a social welfare function, where fairness
can be taken into account by welfare weights. The result from this optimization problem
is that weighted marginal abatement costs should be equalized across all countries. This
challenges the traditional view that marginal costs of abatement across countries should
be equalized to achieve efﬁciency. If the weighted marginal utility of consumption of
the private good is higher in poor countries than in rich, marginal abatement costs
should be lower in poor countries than in rich. However, the papers demonstrate that if
side payments (lump sum transfers) are made available, a cost-effective solution in the
traditional sense may be restored. This would require substantial transfers from rich
to poor countries. Based on this, Sheeran (2006) notes that international transfers to
developing countries are necessary for efﬁciency, even if these are usually favored on
equity grounds.
Another critique of the standard results follows from the realism of the assumptions.
A ﬁrst best solution is characterized by no constraints on the use of policy instruments.
Lump sum transfers are for instance included in the set of feasible polices. If these
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assumptions are not met, the standard result of a uniform global carbon tax must be
reconsidered, see, e.g., Sandmo (2007). Consider, e.g., two countries, one rich and one
poor. If lump sum transfers are not possible, and if the global social welfare function is
egalitarian, the tax in the poor country should be lower than in the rich. This means that
the poor country can devote more resources to the production of private goods and less
to the public good (the environment) and this will therefore work as an income transfer
from the rich country to the poor. Note that this will not separate efﬁciency and justice
considerations. Nonuniform taxes have the cost of lower production efﬁciency, but will
still increase the global social welfare under the assumptions above. Sandmo (2005)
provides a discussion on the implications of this result for a world of many countries.
Instead of introducing country-speciﬁc tax rates, one possibility is to introduce a small
number of tax-rates and applying them to groups of countries.
5.2 Reluctance to Trade Emission Permits and Moral Motivation
One alternative to carbon taxes are tradable emission permits. Under the ideal assump-
tions mentioned above, tradable emissions’ permits will lead to the same outcome as a
uniform carbon tax. The polluters will face a uniform price of polluting, whichwill foster
the traditional cost efﬁciency in environmental policy making (see, e.g., Montgomery
(1972), Schmalensee et al. (1998)).
However, permit trading has been opposed by many such as environmental organiza-
tions and political parties on other grounds than rejecting the ideal assumptions. Some
consider trade in pollution permits as a way to try to avoid one’s obligations, to pay others
to clean up, or to pay indulgence, see the discussion of environmental justice above and
Goodin (1994). In the Kyoto protocol, trade in pollution permits is allowed, but only as
a supplement to national mitigation.19 This mechanism may have been introduced as
a consequence of the majority of the signatories being reluctant about permit trading.
Also in the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) proposals have been raised to
limit the access to buy emission reductions in third party countries (JI — Joint Imple-
mentation for economies in transition and CDM — Clean Development Mechanism for
developing countries) in the third phase (2013–2020). Why is there reluctance to trade
in certain goods such as pollution permits?20
There have been some arguments against trade in emission permits based on conse-
quences (consequentialist equity), such as adverse effects of CDM (e.g., it may create bad
incentives such as to overstate the emission reductions from a project) andHot Air (some
countries get initial emission quotas that are higher than their actual emissions, thus the
effect on the environment is small), loss of potential national beneﬁt from a pollution
permit system (e.g., positive spillovers of technology development and ancillary beneﬁts)
and environmental justice. However, based on procedural equity, it is not enough to know
19 However, attempts to implement a strict supplementarity requirement, such as limiting permit
purchases to 50% of GHG reduction requirements, have failed.
20 For a recent survey on distaste or repugnance for certain transactions, see Roth (2007).
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that the action is the most effective way to attain the aim. One can for instance argue that
industrialized countries have created the global warming problem, and that is their duty
to reduce the consequences of it by cleaning up their own backyard, even if this does not
minimizes overall abatement costs. Another argument is based on unfair background
conditions. Even if two parties agree to trade permits, the trade may not be justiﬁed on
ethical reasons. A voluntary agreement between two parties is not necessarily fair if it is
entered into under conditions that are not fair (Pogge, 1989). Background justice is not
preserved when some participant’s basic rights, opportunities or economic positions are
grossly inferior.
Eyckmans and Kverndokk (2008) investigate how moral considerations, modeled as
preservation of identity, i.e., a person’s self image — as an individual or as a part of a
group (Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005)), affect an endogenous pollution permit trad-
ing equilibrium, in which governments choose in a noncooperative way the amount of
permits they allocate to their domestic industries, i.e., aggregate emissions are deter-
mined in the equilibrium. They show that governments’ moral concerns may actually
increase global emissions but this result depends on the precise formulation of the iden-
tity function, i.e., how identity is speciﬁed. For instance if potential permit importers
feel reluctant to buy permits, global emissions will be higher than in an endogenous
permit trading equilibriumwithoutmoral concerns. The reason is that permit importers
over-allocate their domestic ﬁrms in order to reap strategic permit trade gains (because
of lower global permit prices) and to reduce the amount of permits they have to import
and hence their loss of identity. However, if there is also reluctance to sell permits, the
opposite effect may take place and global emissions might be lower than compared to
the case without moral concerns. Finally, if identity depends on the gap between actual
and ideal emission levels, i.e., a higher gap means lower identity, and where the ﬁrst-best
Pareto efﬁcient emission allocation is deﬁned as the ideal (see Brekke et al. (2003)), global
emissions will always be lower when moral concerns are present.
Both tradable emission permits and carbon taxes are policy instruments working
through price incentives. There is now a growing literature on how price incentives
interact with moral motivation and considerations. First, price incentives such as taxes
may crowd out moral motivation to contribute to a public good such as a good envi-
ronment as it may change the responsibility of the problem from the individual to the
regulating authority (Frey (1997), Brekke et al. (2003)), so the net effect may be low.
However, reciprocity, which means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind
actions, may work the other way (Rabin (1993), Camerer (2003)). If people know that
polluters are punished they may be willing to contribute more too. Finally, if people are
concerned about social norms, i.e., a rule of behavior that is enforced by social sanctions,
public policy may have large effects. In general models of social norms give multiple
equilibria (Nyborg and Rege (2003), Rege (2004)); the more people that follow the norm,
the higher are the sanctions and new information may move the society from one equi-
librium to another. A carbon tax may for instance give information about the severity
of climate change as this is a sign that the Government takes climate change seriously,
and, therefore, change the social norm and bring the society to a new equilibrium where
people act more environmental friendly than before.
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5.3 The Allocation of Emission Permits
In Eyckmans andKverndokk (2008) discussed above, it was assumed that before emission
trading, governments choose in a noncooperativeway the amount of permits they allocate
to their domestic industries.21 In this way, the total emission reduction depends on
the allocation of permits. This resembles closely the reality of international climate
negotiations so far, in particular in the run up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and in the
coming negotiations on a follow up agreement for the post-Kyoto period, as well as the
EU’s emission trading system (ETS).22
However, it has been argued that if the total emission reduction is set independently of
the distribution of tradable emission permits, a system of tradable permitsmakes it possi-
ble to separate efﬁciency and justice considerations, given that the outcome of the trade is
considered equitable. Under the assumption of a competitive market, cost-effectiveness
will result from trade no matter how permits initially are distributed (Montgomery
(1972)), see also the discussion of the Coase Theorem in Section 2.2.23 Based on this, the
initial distribution of permits can be discussed as an intragenerational distributive justice
problem as it concerns the distribution of income within the current generation.24
This view is challenged by the result in Eyckmans et al. (1993) and Chichilnisky and
Heal (1994), as referred above, that weighted marginal costs and not the marginal costs
of abatement should be equalized across countries. These results have implications for
tradable emission permits andChichilnisky andHeal (1994) suggest that onemay need to
look at a Lindahl equilibrium rather than a Walrasian equilibrium in tradable permits, as
a Lindahl equilibrium assigns a different price for the public good for each agent (region)
based on his/her willingness to pay. This is followed up in Chichilnisky et al. (2000)
who also show that in the absence of Lindahl prices, only a ﬁnal number of initial permit
allocations can lead to efﬁciency. Thus, the traditional result that efﬁciency and equity
matters may be separated with tradable emission permits does not necessarily hold.
However, several studies have looked at how distributive justice should ideally be
taken into account in the allocation of tradable emission permits. Below we present three
views.
Kverndokk (1995) was one of the ﬁrst to evaluate different permit allocations for
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions’ permits based on theories of distributive justice. To do
this, he proposed one way to solve this problem, namely by using the meta-principles
introduced in Section 2.4, that is ethical individualism and presentism, together with a
generally accepted principle in global theories of justice of avoiding distributions based
21 This modeling framework was ﬁrst suggested in Helm (2003).
22 The amount of emissions’ permits brought under the EU cap is not ﬁxed.
23 Market power may be a problem in the international permit market (see, e.g., Hagem and Westskog
(1998, 2008)). Concerns have been raised that market power may arise that would skew the distribu-
tion of permit revenues in favor of one or a group of countries (e.g., Eastern European countries as
they are the largest sellers). Given the size of the international permit trading market and number
of potential players, this is unlikely to be a major concern at that level. However, it may matter in
some interregional trading initiatives.
24 This assumed that there is separability of intergenerational and intragenerational justice.
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on moral arbitrariness, i.e., on morally arbitrary factors, factors that are not relevant
for the distribution problem. An analysis using these principles of justice requires a
list of competing allocation rules, since we can say which rules from a given list violate
the principles, but we cannot determine the “best” allocation rule. Thus, the following
simple allocation rules were evaluated:
• A distribution proportional to current CO2 emissions.
• A distribution inversely proportional to accumulated CO2 emissions.
• A distribution proportional to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or to GDP adjusted
by purchasing power parities.
• A distribution proportional to land area.
• A distribution proportional to population.
According to the analysis in Kverndokk (1995), a distribution of permits proportional
to population (equal per capita criteria) appears to be the only rule from the list of
alternative allocation rules that is in accordance with all the three principles of justice.
However, this would require substantial transfers from rich to poor countries (see, e.g.,
Rose et al. (1998)).
Neumayer (2000) also agrees on an equal per capita basis for allocating emission rights,
but he argues in favor of historical accountability, i.e., every human is given an equal share
of the global resource atmosphere independent of place and time. He deﬁnes the term
Historical Emission Debt (HED), which measures how much countries have emitted
compared to their share of world population from the start year, where depreciation of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is taken into account. Countries with a positiveHED
has to compensate countries with a negative HED in the annual permit allocations. Neu-
mayer has three arguments in favor of historical accountability. First, science supports
this rule as climate change is a consequence of the increased concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, which is a function of accumulated emissions. Second, historical
accountability is consistent with the polluter-pays-principle, which is a well established
principle within the OECD countries (OECD (1974)). Finally, historical accountability
is supported by the principle of equality of opportunity (Rawls (1971)), i.e., everybody
should have an equal opportunity to beneﬁt from emissions. Neumayer argues against
several objections to this allocation rule, such as past generations were ignorant and the
developed countries should therefore not be held responsible, that present generations
must not be held accountable for something that was not caused by themselves, positive
spillover effects from the emitting to the nonemitting countries, practical reasons such as
boundary changes and massive economic costs, and ﬁnally, that historical accountability
is closely correlated with current emissions.
Helm and Simonis (2001) also agree that the equitable distribution of the initial
endowment of emission permits should be based on the equal per capita criteria, but
have not addressed the problem of accounting for historical emissions. However, they
argue that this is only a “local” equity problem (see Section 2.4), and that the “global”
equity problem is to develop criteria for a just exchange or trade of the initial endowment
of permits. The authors suggest the following criteria for this exchange to be equitable,
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based on the idea that the use of the common resource (the atmosphere) should exhibit
a certain degree of solidarity:
• Pareto efﬁciency:There shouldbeno reallocations thatmake someonebetter offwithout
making anyone worse off, i.e., there should be an efﬁcient ﬁnal allocation of permits.
• Envy-freeness: Every agent should (weakly) prefer his own share of the common
resource and compensatory payments to the share of any other agent.
• Individual rationality (lower bound): No agent should be made worse off by the trade
in emission rights than he was beforehand. This means that compensation should be
equal to abatement costs.
• Stand-alone criterion (upper bound): No agent should be made better off than he would
be if he were able to use the whole resource on his own. This means that no country
should receive compensation higher than the abatement costs it would save with the
quantity of global emissions rights, i.e., without any abatement efforts.
Based on the two latter criteria, theNorth (developed countries)would have to offset all
of the South’s (developing countries) abatement costs, but the South should not demand
any additional transfers and would have to consent to reduction measures required for
reasons of efﬁciency (the ﬁrst criterion). This solution will also be envy-free (the second
criterion).
If the reallocation of initial entitlements based on equal per capita emission is gov-
erned by competitive markets, the market driven ﬁnal allocation of permits will violate
the stand-alone criterion as developing countries will be better off than without any
environmental restrictions. The authors suggest another mechanism where all countries
are assured the minimum resulting from competitive allocation and stand-alone utility,
called the “WESA mechanism”25 that will meet all four criteria above. Based on this, the
authors claim that we will achieve both local and global equity if the permits are initially
distributed according to an equal per capita allocation and the WESA mechanism is
used for the exchange of permits.26 However, if competitive markets are used without
any restrictions, this would require a different initial allocation rule to meet the criteria
above. Helm and Simonis (2001) show that developing countries then would be given
less and developed countries more than the equal per capita distribution initially to meet
the stand-alone criterion. But the difference from the equal per capita distribution will
diminish over time due to the high growth rates in greenhouse gas emissions in devel-
oping countries. This allocation rule resembles the initial allocation rule suggested by
Cline (1992), where permits are allocated according to current emission levels initially
and then converge into an equal per capita distribution over time (or what has become
known as the “contraction and convergence principle”).
25 WESA = Walrasian mechanism with the stand-alone utility as an upper bound. Thus, this refers
to a market driven equilibrium outcome with restrictions.
26 For a new study that is also concerned about the fair exchange of permits, see Böhringer and Helm
(2008). They provide simulation results from a computable general equilibrium model with an
upper welfare bound that restricts the income from selling permits.
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The outcome of the trade or the exchange is, however, dependent on how emissions
of a country are measured. This opens a discussion on how to assign responsibility
for greenhouse gas emissions. The traditional approach is to assign responsibility for
emissions from your geographical area, so that emissions from production processes in
a country like Norway are assigned to Norway independent of its consumption (pro-
duction accounting principle). This is the approach used in the Kyoto Protocol (see
also IPCC (1996)). With this approach, a country may have a high living standard and
relatively low emissions if it imports all its carbon intensive goods. An alternative is
consumer responsibility, which is to assign emission responsibility for all emissions that
follow from the process that ﬁnally ends in consumption (see, e.g., Ferng (2003)).27 In
this way, a country’s living standard would be more closely connected to its emissions.28
There are pros and contras for both approaches. The production accounting principle
gives incentives for cleaner and more energy efﬁcient production process (including
technology development), but also incentives to transfer dirty production to the devel-
oping world or countries that have not signed a climate treaty (carbon leakages). The
reverse will be the case for the consumption accounting principle. A consequence of the
latter principle would probably be that developing countries are assigned lower levels of
greenhouse gas emissions, while the developed world would be assigned a higher level.
Bastianoni et al. (2004) argues for a principle that represents an intermediate approach,
where greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) should be “assigned to countries or phases of
the process in proportion to the embodied GHG emissions needed along the chain.”
What should be considered the fair approach for assigning responsibility for emissions?
Bastianoni et al. (2004) argue that the consumption accounting principle is fairer than the
production accounting principle because it wouldmake ﬁnal users pay for the greenhouse
gas “bill.” However, production processes are also beneﬁcial for producing countries,
and typical examples of this are countries producing and exporting products based on
natural resources (oil, gas, ﬁsh, and water power). Thus, we think this issue has to be
discussed further from an ethical perspective.
6 WHAT EQUITY PRINCIPLES HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN USED?
Cazorla andToman (2001) have pointed out that a single or compound formula, involving
a combination of equity considerations, is unlikely to satisfy the self-interest of the
majority of the industrialized and developing countries to obtain a truly international
agreement. It could also be said that such a formula might not satisfy a consensus of
countries in terms of pure equity considerations either. Cazorla and Toman suggest that
the “dynamic graduation” formulas, such “contraction and convergence” (Jacoby et al.
(1998), Meyer (2000)), nicely balance short-term and long-term interests of all parties
(see also the approach recommended by Nordhaus (1997)).
27 This is related to the literature on the Ecological Footprint, see, e.g., Wackernagel and Rees (1996).
28 A third possibility could be to assign responsibility for production of fossil fuels.
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Victor (1999) has claimed that equity has had little inﬂuence on negotiating and imple-
menting international agreements on climate change. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol,
for example, Victor (2001) suggests that self interest will continue to dominate uncer-
tainties about future emission trajectories and thus make it difﬁcult to identify equitable
permit allocations, and that, in the end, compliance will not be forth coming if it is not in
a country’s self interest. A recent compendium of papers on the Post-KyotoWorld edited
by Aldy and Stavins (2007) also give short shrift to equity. However, Lange et al. (2007b)
performed a statistical analysis of survey responses of people involved in international
negotiations and concluded that equitywas considered important, with a stronger prefer-
ence being expressed by members of G77 countries. The most favored principles overall
of the small set of six examined are polluter pays, egalitarian, and “poor losers” (basically
analogous to the Rawlsian Maximin). Ringius et al. (2002) concluded that appeals to
fairness make it more likely that agreement will be reached, and, based on an analysis of
the proposals presented by several countries in the run-up to Kyoto, have identiﬁed a set
of such principles that are widely accepted—equality, equity, and exemptions for parties
who lack the capacity to contribute. Still, this begs the question of whether negotiators
can agree on speciﬁc principles for allocating the burden of GHG mitigation.
Despite the extensive examination of equity by analysts and bargaining by policy mak-
ers, its application in climate change policy at all levels has been rather unsophisticated
(Brown, 2002). Only a couple of traditional principles, as well as a few pragmatic alloca-
tion rules based on political compromise, have dominated. For example, the prevailing
principle has been what we termed “Sovereignty” in Table 1 — equal proportional emis-
sions’ reductions by all parties. Because both mitigation costs and beneﬁts are unequally
distributed, this is inconsistent with all other allocation-based and outcome-based prin-
ciples. It might appear that, because it is the outcome of negotiations, it is consistent with
process-based allocations in general and consensus equity in particular, but this smacks
of circular reasoning.
The prime example of using Sovereignty equity based onGHG emissions is theKyoto
Accord, where any departure from the rough group average emission cap had to be
justiﬁed by “differentiated responsibilities,” based on special conditions in an individual
country. Thus, transitional economies, such as Russia, were allowed lower commitments
because of their economic difﬁculties, despite the fact that their economic downturns
would lead to lower emissions in the future anyway, thus exacerbating the “hot air”
problem. Other special circumstances included Australia’s emissions cap of 108% of its
1990 baseline (in comparison to the group average of approximately 93% of 1990 levels)
because of its heavy reliance on coal exports. Note that differentiation was not put forth
expressly as an equity principle but as an ad hoc appeal to special circumstances. The
industrialized countries were wary of using equity as an explicit argument, because they
were concerned the argument could be turned against them bymore than 100 developing
countries (DCs) at some time in the future.
Similar proportional emission cutbacks pervaded the major regional climate agree-
ment in the United States — the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) among
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states. More recently, however, as the target date nears and
concerns about compliance costs increase, discussions have arisen about target levels
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and relative positions of individual states.29 Based on this experience, those beginning
to negotiate a GHG trading arrangement in the Western States in the United States,
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), are beginning to look at equity head-on. Their
ﬁrst foray at the time of this writing is a mixed formula for future emissions growth
that involves a weighted average of proportional cutbacks, energy use, and population.
Still, the focus is on simple reference bases, rather than a deeper discussion of equity.
Moreover, the mixed formula represents more of a way of achieving group consensus
and ﬁnesses the hard choice of a single criterion.
The major area in which equity is now critical and under which much activity is
underway is in bringing DCs into the fold in terms of actual mitigation commitments,
or simply involvement in ﬂexibility mechanisms beyond CDM. One equity formula
that has been popular for years and holds the prospect of easing some of the tensions
regarding the egalitarian principle is “contraction and convergence” (see, e.g., Cline
(1992)). This calls for proportional cutbacks of emissions with respect to a baseline level
among individual countries now but with eventual adjustment over time to a point where
emission permits would be assigned on a per capita basis. It is believed that the 20–30
year convergence target date would give industrialized countries time to adjust so that
the large future emission reductions or permit purchases would not be anywhere near
as costly as would be the implementation of the egalitarian principle during the ﬁrst, or
even second, Kyoto compliance period (Jacoby et al. (1998)).
The second approach is the “no harm” principle (see Edmonds et al. (1995)), which
calls for an allocation of permits that would result in no net positive costs for DCs. Rose
et al. (1998) have pointed out that this is essentially a variant of a welfarist version of the
Rawlsian Maximin principle.30 In any case, there are two interpretations of the no-harm
rule. The ﬁrst is to give DCs permits equal to their baseline emissions. The advantage is
that it means they have a sufﬁcient number of permits such that no mitigation is neces-
sary, nor is it necessary for them to be involved in the permit market initially. However,
once they are comfortable with doing so, it is hoped that DCs would see the advantage
of selling permits to gain revenues. When they do so, industrialized countries will gain
by having their compliance signiﬁcantly lowered by access to relatively cheaper miti-
gation/sequestration options. The second variant of the no-harm rule calls for permit
allocations for DCs such that, after trading, they incur no net costs, i.e., any revenue
gains from trading are limited because permit allocations are set below baseline levels.
In this case, DCs incur no net costs and industrialized countries, which will still incur
positive net costs, are still helped by access to relatively cheaper options. Note that the
ﬁrst variant is an “allocation-based” principle, where individual country permit levels
are determined at the outset. The second is an “outcome-based” rule that considers
29 Several of the RGGI states have decided to auction rather than grandfather their permits and to use
the revenues to promote energy efﬁciency including effectively lowering energy prices and targeting
low-income households for energy efﬁciency investments (State of Maine (2007)).
30 We have listed the Rawlsian Maximin principle in the group of outcome-based equity criteria in
Table 1. However, many would argue that Rawls was not so much interested in the outcome as in
the process.
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the results of the post-trading stage. The ﬁrst involves less uncertainty than the second
because it is not based on an unknown second step. The uncertainty, however, can be
reduced by a central authority ensuring a zero net cost outcome through ﬁnancial trans-
fers out of a common pool, whose funds might be provided by industrialized countries or
by any excess revenues (over zero net cost) from the group of DCs.31 In the second case,
DCs are more likely to be engaged in permit trading because the initial permit allocation
requires them to undertake mitigation, and they will be looking for ways to reduce com-
pliance costs. Rose and Wei (2008) have simulated the implications of these two permit
allocations for Paciﬁc Rim countries and found that the ﬁrst allocation variant would
result in signiﬁcant gains for China and other developing countries, while, of course, the
second would have a neutral effect on them. Interestingly, the largest absolute gains in
either case are projected to go to industrialized countries, most notably Japan.
7 EQUITY AND UNCERTAINTY — ARE EMISSION REDUCTIONS
REALLY NECESSARY OR ARE THERE OTHER WAYS?
To signiﬁcantly reduce the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, broad
international cooperation is required. As discussed in Section 4, the literature is not very
optimistic when it comes to a broad international agreement on emission reductions, due
to the incentives to free ride. However, other approaches to reduce climate change have
been proposed over the last couple of decades. One alternative is geoengineering, which
seems to be a taboo in the debate on climate policy, andmost economic analyses of climate
change have ignored it.32 Geoengineering does not have a singular deﬁnition, but we
follow Barrett (2008) who refers to measures that counteract climate change by reducing
the amount of solar radiation that strikes the earth.33 Examples of this are installation
of a barrier to sunlight between the earth and the sun, placing various particles or gases
in the atmosphere to block incoming sunlight, or to make low-level clouds from sea
water that also would reﬂect incoming sunlight. While geoengineering will not reduce
the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, it will decouple temperature
from the atmospheric concentration. Still, a host of known problems, such as increasing
ocean acidiﬁcation, as well as many unknowns, remain.
IPCC regards geoengineering as “largely speculative and may have a risk of unknown
side effects” (Barker et al. (2007)). However, there are reasons to believe that such
measures will become higher on the political agenda in the future. In contrast to emission
reductions, some of the proposals are inexpensive and can, thus, be undertaken by a single
country unilaterally (Barrett (2008)).34 Thus, in contrast to agreements on emission
31 Of course the practicality of such an arrangement is open to question.
32 An early discussion is Schelling (1996).
33 Other alternatives are iron or nitrogen fertilization of the oceans, see Barker et al. (2007). They may
also be classiﬁed as geoengineering, but we choose to follow Barret’s (2008) deﬁnition.
34 It has yet to be discussed whether unilateral action is in accordance with international law.
Equity and Justice in Global Warming Policy 169
reduction, where it is hard to create incentives to sign an agreement, here countries have
an incentive to do this unilaterally or as a part of a small coalition.
There are several ethical aspects connected to geoengineering that are not fully dis-
cussed. One aspect of procedural ethics is to what extent we should change the func-
tioning of the nature. We are in a process of changing the climate on the earth due to
our emissions of greenhouse gases. Is changing the climate due to bioengineering any
different? Consider for instance the possibility to reduce solar radiation by emitting
particles in the atmosphere. This already happens naturally from volcanic eruptions.
Also, human activities due to burning of coal for instance emit sulfate particles in the
atmosphere. What is the difference between these and particles we purposefully might
place in the atmosphere to block sunlight? Can theories of justice guide us on this? Why
is geoengineering actually considered a taboo in climate policy; is this due to the ethical
concerns or just related to risk? An aspect of distributional justice has to do with winners
and losers of geoengineering. How should we account for the fact that this measure will
affect countries differently?
Recently the debate over whether it is best to strongly mitigate GHGs or to be less
stringent and simply adapt to the climate changes has accelerated.35 Burden sharing
for poor country adaptation to climate change gives rise to issues very similar to those
discussed with respect to mitigation (Tol (2005)). However, the argument for adaptation
is often facile and ignores irreversibilities, as well as the fact that prior success of human
adaptation took hundreds, if not thousands, of years, and not merely decades. Since
we are unlikely to actually reduce concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere in the
foreseeable future, but just to slow their build-up, some adaptation will be necessary.
Studies indicate that the poor, aged, and inﬁrm are the least likely to cope. Women, who
are typically lower paid, and who have a relatively greater responsibility for child rearing
are also likely to ﬁnd adaptation relatively more difﬁcult because of their lower levels of
resources and time, as well as more limited choices (IPCC (2001)). At the international
level, the areas that are likely to be the most affected — low-lying areas in general and
the belt around the equator, i.e., the relatively poorer areas — are also the ones that have
the fewest resources to adapt. The Darwinian dictum of “survival of the ﬁttest” rings
hollow from an equity standpoint. However, as we need both mitigation and adaptation,
we would welcome a better understanding of what is a fair international sharing of
the burden for developing and deploying adaptation strategies (see Paavola and Adger
(2005), for a ﬁrst approach).
The problems mentioned here on uncertainty and risk also link to the precautionary
principle (see, e.g., O’Riordan and Cameron (1995)) and the issues about the quality
35 There also exists a climate adaptation fund with the aim to help protect those most vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change, like drought, ﬂooding, and severe storms. The fund is managed
by the Global Environment Facility, an independent ﬁnancial organization, and was established in
Kyoto in 1997, but has been criticized for being too difﬁcult to access and for raising only paltry
sums of money. Under an agreement reached by delegates at the UNCCC Bali conference in 2007,
the adaptation fund is now to be maintained using a 2 percent tax on transactions within the Clean
Development Mechanism.
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of life for future generations. Thus, the approaches discussed in this section have clear
intergenerational aspects as well.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Equity cannot be ignored in climate change policy like it is in somany other policy realms.
The fact that the problem is a global one and that the most-effective solutions require
cooperation among sovereign entities means that fairness must be taken into account
for reasons of positive economics even if there is a tendency to avoid the normative.
Many principles of equity that are applicable at the interpersonal level translate nicely to
the international and interregional levels and can serve as the basis of sound normative
judgments.
Interestingly, most climate agreements thus far have ﬁnessed some difﬁcult equity
issues. In the international domain, GHG mitigation targets have mainly been agreed to
by industrialized countries, meaning those with the means to undertake them without
seriously comprising their rates of economic growth. Variations in the commitments
have been addressed with the euphemism of “differentiated responsibilities,” a type of
equity argument that appears easier to swallow. Similar situations of a limited range of
diversity of interests have arisen in the regional trading initiative of the Europe Union
and in relatively homogenous areas of theUnited States. The difﬁcult equity conﬂicts are
still to be resolved, however, primarily getting developing countries, some of which are
becoming the most prominent GHG emitters, to agree to signiﬁcant mitigation targets
and timetables.
Research has helped advance climate policy on both efﬁciency and equity fronts.
Cap and trade, under a broad set of conditions (auctioning versus free-granting, unre-
stricted prices versus price caps, current allocations versus banking/borrowing) has the
ability to reduce emissions at least cost and to also address equity head on through
the allocation of permits. While researchers have not solved the puzzle of identifying
the best deﬁnition of equity, they have provided operational deﬁnitions and practi-
cal models that can be used by policy-makers to identify the implications of various
alternatives.
Although themain focus of equity in climate policy thus far has been across geographic
areas, it is the individual levelwhere equity is reallymeasured.Traditional ﬁscal incidence
analysis can readily be applied to the cost side of the equation, but equity on the beneﬁt
side represents the real challenge as potential catastrophic impacts of inaction continue
to be identiﬁed.
We have mentioned several topics in this paper where equity issues are not fully
analyzed yet. As equity is important in social and political relations, we would also
welcome more studies in economics where moral and ethical considerations are taken
into account by the decision makers. People do not always act as Homo Economi-
cus (Thaler (2000)), and economic models that take preferences for equity into
account are important in the entire discipline of economics including environmental
economics.
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